

***** T O P S E C R E T *****

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[TS - HK - AA 747]

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DI 200855ZTO THE SITUATION ROOM
FM USLO PEKING

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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SEPTEMBER 20, 1973

FROM: DAVID BRUCE
TO: HENRY KISSINGER

1. FRENCH EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELLOR CHARLES MALO (PROTECT) TODAY GAVE DC JENKINS FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF HIGHLIGHTS POMPIDOU-CHOU EN-LAI TALKS DURING FRENCH PRESIDENT'S VISIT.
2. FRENCH ARE EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE RECEPTION ACCORDED PRESIDENT POMPIDOU, WHICH WAS BETTER THAN EXPECTED. MALO SAID THE CHINESE WERE VERY GOOD AT SPRINGING A DAILY "SATISFACTION IMPREVUE" SUCH AS APPEARANCE OF HIGHER LEVEL PERSONNEL THAN EXPECTED AT VARIOUS FUNCTIONS, THE EARLY AND LENGTHY MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO, AND CHOU'S ACCOMPANYING POMPIDOU THROUGHOUT THE UNOFFICIAL PART OF THE VISIT AFTER PEKING. ON THE EVENING LEFT FREE THE PREMIER SUDDENLY CALLED POMPIDOU AND ASKED HIM TO DINNER A DEUX (WITH ONLY ONE INTERPRETER). POMPIDOU COUNTERED THAT CHOU HAD ENTERTAINED HIM THE PREVIOUS EVENING, SO INVITED HIM TO THE GUEST HOUSE THAT EVENING FOR A FRENCH DINNER. ALTHOUGH STOPS AFTER PEKING WERE BILLED AS UNOFFICIAL, THERE WERE "HUNDREDS OF DANCING BEARS" AT THE AIRPORTS AND THOUSANDS OF THE POPULACE LINING THE STREETS.
3. ALTHOUGH A COMMUNIQUE "ALWAYS TAKES TIME", THE FRENCH ENCOUNTERED LITTLE TROUBLE IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON IT. THE CHINESE WANTED A WHOLE PARAGRAPH ON HEGEMONY, BUT THE FRENCH TALKED THEM INTO HAVING ONLY ONE SENTENCE. THE CHINESE MADE QUITE A POINT ON THE FACT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE PROBLEM OF HEGEMONY IN THE U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE. THEY SAID THAT THE JAPANESE WERE RELUCTANT TO HAVE IT IN THEIRS UNTIL THE CHINESE TOLD THEM THAT THE AMERICANS HAD INITIATED THE IDEA IN THE SINO-U.S. COMMUNIQUE. CHOU WONDERED WHETHER THE LACK OF MENTION OF HEGEMONY IN THE U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE MEANT THAT THE U.S. WAS WILLING TO HAVE A POLICY AGAINST HEGEMONY IN ASIA BUT UNWILLING IN EUROPE.

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HAK, SCROFT, HOWE, RODMAN, MCFARLANE, LORD

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State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MORI/CDF per C05074051

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4. THE USUAL LENGTHY TOUR D'HORIZON WAS HELD IN WHICH MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD WERE DISCUSSED. THE CHINESE SPENT A LONG TIME ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WHICH, CHOU SAID, HAD GREATLY IMPROVED OF LATE. HE DWELLED ON THE EARLY PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. SAYING THAT THE U.S. POSITION ORIGINALLY WAS THAT TAIWAN WAS A PART OF CHINA, YET THE SEVENTH FLEET WAS PUT IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS. THIS WAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE KOREAN WAR, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT CHINA HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT WAR FOR SOME TIME, I.E. UNTIL THE U.S. MARCHED NORTH. CHOU MADE BITTER REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT DULLES WOULD NOT SHAKE HANDS WITH HIM IN 1954 AND SAID THAT IT TOOK THE CHINESE A LONG TIME TO GET OVER THAT SLIGHT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE CHINESE MADE A MISTAKE IN SIGNING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHEN THE U.S. REFUSED TO DO SO.

5. CHOU SAID THAT THE DETENTE IN EUROPE WAS DANGEROUS BECAUSE EUROPEAN NATIONS WOULD BECOME SO MESMERIZED WITH THE ADVANTAGES OF PEACEFUL PURSUITS THAT THEY WOULD NOT PAY ENOUGH ATTENTION TO DEFENSE. CHIAO KUAN-HUA OBSERVED THAT WHILE GERMANY IN 1947 WAS OBVIOUSLY PREPARING FOR MILITARY ADVENTURE, AS SOON AS ONE CROSSED OVER THE BORDER INTO FRANCE THERE WAS ONLY TALK OF PEACE. A SIMILARLY DANGEROUS PSYCHOLOGY COULD NOW ARISE. POMPIDOU SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR AMERICAN FORCES TO REMAIN IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. CHOU SAID HE FULLY AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD REMAIN NOT ONLY THERE BUT "EVEN IN ASIA". WHERE THERE WAS FIGHTING, HOWEVER, THE FIGHTING SHOULD STOP AND THE U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THOSE AREAS. CAMBODIA IS THE URGENT PROBLEM NOW, MORE URGENT THAN TAIWAN. ONE CAN SPEAK OF DETENTE IN EUROPE BUT NOT IN ASIA AS LONG AS THE VIETNAM SITUATION IS STILL UNCERTAIN, THE CAMBODIAN WAR GOES ON AND THE TAIWAN PROBLEM REMAINS.

6. THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH. CHOU WAS AGITATED OVER THE SECRET BOMBING IN CAMBODIA. (THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT CHOU'S ATTITUDE INCLUDED PERSONAL AFFRONT AT LEARNING OF THIS.) CHOU SAID FRANCE SHOULD RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. SHOULD THEN DO SO. IF THEY DID BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD FIND THAT THEY COULD RETAIN CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA. IF THINGS CONTINUED IN THE PRESENT DIRECTION, HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE FAR LESS LIKELY. HE SAID THAT ON SEPTEMBER 12 SIHANOUK HAD SENT A VERY POLITE LETTER TO THE THREE TOP SOVIET LEADERS ASKING THAT THE USSR RECOGNIZE HIS GOVERNMENT. CHOU SAID IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD RECOGNIZE SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE U.S. DID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA. POMPIDOU SAID HE WOULD GO HOME AND THINK ABOUT IT. (MALO SAID IN ANY EVENT FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO PHNOM PENH WOULD SOON RECEIVE ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT AND THERE WOULD NOT BE A REPLACEMENT. THIS "WOULD MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, SINCE HE HAD BEEN RESIDENT IN PARIS FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS.") CHOU SAID HE FOUND THE US POSITION ON CAMBODIA "INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND

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UNBELIEVABLE."

7. CHOU SAID THE CHINESE WERE ANXIOUS TO TALK TO THE INDIANS BUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT DO SO UNTIL PAKISTANI-BANGLADESH PROBLEMS HAD BEEN SETTLED.

8. CHOU THOUGHT THE JAPANESE SHOULD DEVELOP A DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN; OTHERWISE, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE JAPANESE-U.S. DEFENSE TREATY.

9. THE SOVIETS WERE BLASTED THROUGHOUT IN TERMS FAMILIAR TO ALL. CHOU SAID HE COULD CONCEIVE OF AN ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS WHICH MIGHT PRESS TO THE YELLOW RIVER. HE SAID "EVEN IF" THIS WAS COMBINED WITH AN ATTACK BY JAPAN ON THE EAST, BY THE U.S. IN THE SOUTH AND BY INDIA IN THE WEST, CHINA WAS READY AND COULD NOT BE CONQUERED IN THE END. CHOU EMPHASIZED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND CHINESE SOCIETIES. AS ONE ILLUSTRATION HE SAID CHINESE DAILY PRINTED MANY ARTICLES FROM PRESS OF THE WORLD "WITHOUT CHANGING ONE WORD" AND THESE DAILY COMPILATIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO CADRE IN 5,000 COPIES. CHAIRMAN MAO HAD RECENTLY COMMENTED THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED "IN SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS" AND THIS WOULD SOON BE DONE. CHOU SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER DO THIS.

10. CHINESE TOOK WELL-KNOWN LINE ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS. FRENCH THOUGHT IT INTERESTING THAT CHOU SAID IF IN FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE ENTIRELY DISPOSED OF, "THIS WOULD REQUIRE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION."

11. MAO SAID POMPIDOU HAD EXPRESSED TO FRENCH EMBASSY PERSONNEL HIS COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH CHINESE VISIT.

12. WARM REGARDS.

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